The Semiotics of Embodied Interaction… Hermeneutic Circle

O’Neill, S. (2008) Interactive Media: The Semiotics of Embodied Interaction. London: Springer-Verlag.

“Related to the concepts of ‘Ready-to-hand’ and ‘Present-to-hand’ are the concepts of ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ being. For Heidegger, ‘authentic’ being comes about through experiencing the world as ready-to-hand in its firstness, its primary authentically disclosed state in a direct one to one relationship with a natural environment without any mediation. ‘Inauthentic’ being then, for Heidegger, is the experience of being-in-the-world that is predominantly based on being thrown into a prescribed world; i.e., it is an experience of living in a media-saturated world where most of our experiences are second hand. Both ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ experiences can occur in relation to both ready-to-hand and present-to-hand modes of being. That is, we can experience the natural world and the mediated world from the perspective of doing things with it or thinking about it.” (p136)

Annotation

An individual absorbs new knowledge from a variety of authentic (direct) and inauthentic (mediated) sources throughout their life. This impacts on an individual’s interpretation at any time (Bohman, 1991, p140), and explain aspects of deviation of interpretation when compared to the collective in a hermeneutic circle.

Beneath Interpretation… No Understanding is Foundational

SHUSTERMAN, R. (1991) Beneath Interpretation. In: D.R. HILEY, J.F. BOHMAN, and R. SHUSTERMAN (Eds.) The Interpretive Turn. Cornell University Press. pp102-128

“Since our current hermeneutic turn derives in large part from the rejection of foundationalism, it is not surprising that the central arguments for hermeneutic universalism turn on rejecting foundationalist ideas of transparent fact, absolute and univocal truth, and mind-independent objectivity. For such ideas underwrite the possibility of attaining some perfect God’s-eye grasp of things as they really are, independent of how we differently perceive them, a seeing or understanding that is free from corrigibility and perspectival pluralities and prejudices that we willingly recognize as intrinsic to all interpretation. I think the universalists are right to reject such foundational understanding, but wrong to conclude from this that all understanding is interpretation. Their mistake, a grave but simple one, is to equate the nonfoundational with the interpretive. In other words, what the universalists are successfully arguing is that all understanding is nonfoundational; that is always corrigible, perspectival, and somehow prejudiced or prestructured; that no meaningful experience is passively neutral and disinterestedly nonselective. But since, in the traditional foundationalist framework, interpretation is contrasted and designated as the form of nonfoundational understanding, the inferior foster home of all corrigible, perspectival perception, it is easy to confuse the view that no understanding is foundational with the view that all understanding is interpretive. Yet this confusion of hermeneutic universalism betrays an unseemly residual bond to the foundationalist framework, in the assumption that what is not foundational must be interpretive.” (pp108-109)

Annotation

There are intrinsic prejudices within interpretation as we all perceive within our own reality, collectively mediated within the socio-cultural conditions we share. Hermeneutic interpretation rejects any foundationalist ideas that there is an absolute truth, for a pluralism of perspectival truth that can be corrected, rectified, or reformed with fresh data. But there is a danger in assuming that all understanding that does not have a foundational base has to be interpretive. Prof. Shusterman (1991) cautions that a pragmatic universalist perspective on understanding as nonfoundational should not confuse “the view that no understanding is foundational with the view that all understanding is interpretive” (pp108-109). Equating the interpretative with the nonfoundational has a danger of seeing all understanding as interpretation. Palmer (1969) does have the distance to see understanding as a preliminary act of interpretation, and Bohman (1991) from a holistic perspective acknowledges that a ‘correct’ functionalist or deterministic interpretation cannot explain how humans process and experience the world.

Holism without Skepticism… Unthinking Drones?

BOHMAN, J.F. (1991) Holism without Skepticism: Contexualism and the Limits of Interpretation. In: D.R. HILEY, J.F. BOHMAN, and R. SHUSTERMAN (Eds.) The Interpretive Turn. Cornell University Press. pp129-154

“Although the appeal to some unexamined assumptions is a formal requirement of interpretation, it remains an empirical question the degree to which the prejudices of a specific interpreter with the background of a specific culture distort his or her interpretations. As the ethnomethodologists put it, being socialized into a culture or background does not turn us into ‘judgmental dopes’ who passively and unreflectively assimilate roles, norms, and skills. The necessity of the background establishes nothing about the status of any particular belief or skill, any particular interpretation or practice.” (p140)

Annotation:
Although the chosen methodology I have taken is a phenomenological one, there are similarities with an ethnomethodologist approach. What is useful from that perspective is the defence of the individual within a socio-cultural context. Although an individual’s interpretation will be influenced by their own existing knowledge, prior experiences and socio-cultural norms, this does not mean that the individual is an un-thinking drone within their own socialisation within the dominant culture. Culture is man-made and therefore changeable as new ideas and concepts replace out-dated ones. An individual absorbs new knowledge from a variety of authentic (direct) and inauthentic (mediated) sources throughout their life. This impacts on an individual’s interpretation at any time, and explain aspects of deviation of interpretation when compared to the collective in a hermeneutic circle. 

Holism without Skepticism… Scepticism

BOHMAN, J.F. (1991) Holism without Skepticism: Contexualism and the Limits of Interpretation. In: D.R. HILEY, J.F. BOHMAN, and R. SHUSTERMAN (Eds.) The Interpretive Turn. Cornell University Press. pp129-154

“Even if such norms of ‘completeness’ or the evidence of ‘things themselves’ exist, circularity at least makes it indeterminate how they should be applied in any given case: ‘correct’ interpretations are not produced by some standardized method, algorithm, or semantic theory.” (p137)

Annotation:
The nature of interpretation as understood within a holistic and phenomenological perspective acknowledges that a ‘correct’ interpretation cannot be produced by functionalist or deterministic hard science, as science is not suited to the explaining how humans process and experience the world. From a functionalist and deterministic perspective the hermeneutic methods are viewed at best with scepticism and at worst academic hostility. 

Holism without Skepticism… Circularity

BOHMAN, J.F. (1991) Holism without Skepticism: Contexualism and the Limits of Interpretation. In: D.R. HILEY, J.F. BOHMAN, and R. SHUSTERMAN (Eds.) The Interpretive Turn. Cornell University Press. pp129-154

“the background thesis makes all actions, theories, and expressions context dependent. Taken together, circularity and reference to a background exclude the possibility of reducing interpretations to semantic explication or to some other procedure for fixing determinate meanings without reference to holistic constraints. These two premises [_1&2] alone are sufficient to warrant scepticism about interpretation. It is commonplace in hermeneutics to argue that circularity need not be vicious.” (p137)

Annotation:
The fact that interpretation is circular, perspectival and exists within a socio-cultural context (meaning the interpreter’s actions and expressions are context dependent) does not mean that the circularity itself be vicious. Just because a determinate meaning cannot be achieved, due to such an existential problem of the individual’s understanding of being-in-the-world, doesn’t mean that understanding cannot be reached within using a hermeneutic circle. On the contrary. 

Holism without Skepticism… Hermeneutic Circle

BOHMAN, J.F. (1991) Holism without Skepticism: Contexualism and the Limits of Interpretation. In: D.R. HILEY, J.F. BOHMAN, and R. SHUSTERMAN (Eds.) The Interpretive Turn. Cornell University Press. pp129-154

“The thesis of the ‘hermeneutic circle’ has formed the core of almost every holistic theory of interpretation since Friedrich Schleiermacher, both as an explication of the relation of parts to the wholes in interpretation and as a denial of the possibility of a separate metalanguage to discuss interpretations (because interpretation is circular, every treatment of an interpretation is itself an interpretation). If correct, it also means that interpretations cannot be independent of the standpoint of the interpreter, in that interpreters are embedded in their situation and hence their understanding remains partial and incomplete. The language of the interpreter is not some metalanguage outside the circle, but a fallible and partial understanding within it.” (p136)

Annotation:
The hermeneutic circle accepts that the language the individual applies in their interpretation is part of the phenomenological study itself. The interpreter is within their existence in which the thing to be interpreted also exists, and so is the phenomenologist wishing to make sense of the interpreter. They are embedded in the world and although they cannot truly see each other’s worlds directly, the phenomenologist must acknowledge and ‘bracket out’ their own experience to be objective in the use of a hermeneutic circle. As each interpreter’s interpretation will be partial and incomplete due to their individual powers of description and dissemination, the circle compares each interpretation to the others to extract the common elements in the experience that the interpretations share to come to some understanding as to what constitutes the phenomenon itself that is being studied. 

Holism without Skepticism… Epistemic Justification

BOHMAN, J.F. (1991) Holism without Skepticism: Contexualism and the Limits of Interpretation. In: D.R. HILEY, J.F. BOHMAN, and R. SHUSTERMAN (Eds.) The Interpretive Turn. Cornell University Press. pp129-154

“The Transcendental Argument for Strong Holism

(1)    Interpretation is circular, indeterminate, and perspectival (the thesis of the ‘hermeneutic circle’)

(2)    Interpretation occurs only against a ‘background,’ a network of unspecifiable beliefs and practices (the thesis of the ‘background’)

(3)    The background is a condition for the possibility of interpretation, which limits its possibilities for epistemic justification (the thesis of contextual limits)

(4)    All cognitive activities take place against a background and are interpretive and hence circular, indeterminate, and perspectival (the thesis of the universality of interpretation). Therefore, the conditions of interpretation are such that no ‘true’ or ‘correct’ interpretations are possible (interpretive scepticism).” (pp135-136)

Annotation:
The argument for a holistic framing for interpretation comes in four stages. First, interpretation is circular and comes from a personal perspective of the interpreter. Therefore the interpretation is indeterminate as ‘correct.’ Secondly, interpretation can only happen within a context of a person’s socio-cultural background, informed by their own previous experiences and tacit knowledge. For such an interpretation to make sense to the individual as far as they perceive it, it is one that will be shared (to varying degrees) within a socio-cultural group. This is an epistemic justification. There is some basis to accept the individual’s interpretation as ‘correct’ as it is supported by existing ideas and concepts that infer an accepted probability that infers that the interpretation is valid. This supporting idea or concept must be accepted as being ‘true’ and not irrational, as otherwise the interpretation will be false. There needs to be justification that the supporting idea or concept that the new interpretation springs from is accepted as correct. 

Holism without Skepticism… Holism Framed Interpretation

BOHMAN, J.F. (1991) Holism without Skepticism: Contexualism and the Limits of Interpretation. In: D.R. HILEY, J.F. BOHMAN, and R. SHUSTERMAN (Eds.) The Interpretive Turn. Cornell University Press. pp129-154

“the perspectival and contextual character of interpretation leads to the most common form of scepticism about interpretation: since we can interpret thing only from ‘our’ point of view, our interpretations are inevitably ethnocentric. It is impossible to understand others as they understand themselves: we understand them only according to ‘our own lights.’ My aim here is to dispute the common philosophical basis for all such views that assert that there are such inherent, contextual limits on how we interpret others.” (pp130-131)

Annotation:
Phenomenology attempts to reveal and understand the individual’s perception of an experience. Bohman is using a transcendental Holism that is useful to a phenomenologist as it frames an understanding on the nature of interpretation. Coming from a nursing perspective Holism treats the whole person rather than just the problem. The theory is that there is an interconnection between the parts that constitute the whole. With such an interconnection the parts cannot be wholly understood without understanding the whole. This is circular, reiterative and integrated. Therefore this is helpful to a phenomenological hermeneutic circle being applied to interpret and understand how people perceive and experience an interaction in their lives. 

Holism without Skepticism… Circular Interpretation

BOHMAN, J.F. (1991) Holism without Skepticism: Contexualism and the Limits of Interpretation. In: D.R. HILEY, J.F. BOHMAN, and R. SHUSTERMAN (Eds.) The Interpretive Turn. Cornell University Press. pp129-154

“The universality of interpretation, they argue, is a direct consequence of the fact that no cognitive activity can privilege a particular content as ‘given’ or ‘self-verifying’ apart from the context of all other contents and activities. If this is true, then it follows that all such activities are interpretive and that any belief or practice can be understood only in light of all other beliefs and practices. Hence, sceptical contextualism is a two-step thesis: first, that interpretation is universal and hence ubiquitous in every cognitive activity; and second, that it is holistic and hence takes place only against the background of all our beliefs and practices. Together these two theses imply that no interpretation can be singled out as uniquely correct, since the assertion that it is so would itself be an interpretation within a particular context. Thus, this conclusion is but one way of expressing the famous ‘hermeneutic circle:’ everything is interpretation, and interpretation is itself indeterminate, contextual, and circular.” (p130)

Annotation:
As interpretation itself is mediated through socio-cultural contexts and personal experiences what is interpreted makes sense to the interpreter but may not be ‘correct’ when compared to the interpretations of others. If it is accepted that interpretation in itself is contextual and circular, and open to revision and change with fresh insights then the hermeneutic circle offers a way to manage any individual and collective interpretation. In the circle the individual interpretation is examined phenomenologically, and referred back to the interpretations of the collective mass to reveal commonalities in the interpretations. Only then can a real sense of what is the agreed interpretation be arrived at. 

Holism without Skepticism… Interpretation

BOHMAN, J.F. (1991) Holism without Skepticism: Contexualism and the Limits of Interpretation. In: D.R. HILEY, J.F. BOHMAN, and R. SHUSTERMAN (Eds.) The Interpretive Turn. Cornell University Press. pp129-154

“When called into question, interpretations must be supported by reasons, and it is a philosophical question when such claims are justified and if such issues can be settled rationally.” (p129)

Annotation:
Interpretation is founded on reasoning. In the average person their interpretation is not based on any philosophical high theory, rather on their own tacit knowledge, previous experience and socio-cultural and even religious predilections.