Beneath Interpretation… Distinction Between Understanding and Interpretation

SHUSTERMAN, R. (1991) Beneath Interpretation. In: D.R. HILEY, J.F. BOHMAN, and R. SHUSTERMAN (Eds.) The Interpretive Turn. Cornell University Press. pp102-128

“we can only test our prior understanding by subsequent interpretation (…). Considerations of this sort have led Gadamer and other hermeneutic universalists to the radical claim that ‘all understanding is interpretation.’ But this claim, I have argued, is not only uncompelling but misleading in suggesting that we can never understand anything without interpreting it. For in many cases we are simply satisfied with our initial understanding and do not go on to interpret; there are always other and usually better things to do. Moreover, if we could never understand anything without interpreting it, how could we ever understand the interpretation itself? It, too, would have to be interpreted, and so would its interpretation, and so on ad infinitum. As Wittgenstein notes, ‘Any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets.’ Interpretation must ultimately depend on some prior understanding, some ‘way of grasping…which is not an interpretation.’ This is just a point of philosophical grammar about how these notions are related: understanding grounds and guides interpretation, while interpretation enlarges, validates, or corrects understanding. We must remember that the distinction is functional or relational, not ontological. The prior and grounding understanding ‘which is not an interpretation’ may have been the product of prior interpretations, though now it is immediately grasped. Moreover, it need be an explicitly formulated or conscious understanding, and the ground it provides in not an incorrigible ground.” (p122)

Annotation
Shusterman sees the distinction between understanding and interpretation not as ‘all understanding is interpretation,’ nor a metaphysical state of being (ontological), but as relational or functional. The relationship can be described as, “understanding grounds and guides interpretation, while interpretation enlarges, validates, or corrects understanding” (p122). As he points out if understanding is interpretation and we could never understand anything without an interpretation, then “how could we ever understand the interpretation itself?” (ibid.).  Hirsh (1976) agrees and urges that when the person interprets they first are trying to match what they sense with what they already know in order to first understand before and interpretation and explanation can begin.  Validation is a factor in interpretation and can be placed within systematic process of understanding > construction of meaning > interpretation > validation. When validation is achieved it is “only with respect to known hypotheses and known facts” (Hirsch, 1967, p170). Palmer (1969) points out that in itself understanding is a preliminary act of interpretation from which future interpretations are built. 

Beneath Interpretation… No Understanding is Foundational

SHUSTERMAN, R. (1991) Beneath Interpretation. In: D.R. HILEY, J.F. BOHMAN, and R. SHUSTERMAN (Eds.) The Interpretive Turn. Cornell University Press. pp102-128

“Since our current hermeneutic turn derives in large part from the rejection of foundationalism, it is not surprising that the central arguments for hermeneutic universalism turn on rejecting foundationalist ideas of transparent fact, absolute and univocal truth, and mind-independent objectivity. For such ideas underwrite the possibility of attaining some perfect God’s-eye grasp of things as they really are, independent of how we differently perceive them, a seeing or understanding that is free from corrigibility and perspectival pluralities and prejudices that we willingly recognize as intrinsic to all interpretation. I think the universalists are right to reject such foundational understanding, but wrong to conclude from this that all understanding is interpretation. Their mistake, a grave but simple one, is to equate the nonfoundational with the interpretive. In other words, what the universalists are successfully arguing is that all understanding is nonfoundational; that is always corrigible, perspectival, and somehow prejudiced or prestructured; that no meaningful experience is passively neutral and disinterestedly nonselective. But since, in the traditional foundationalist framework, interpretation is contrasted and designated as the form of nonfoundational understanding, the inferior foster home of all corrigible, perspectival perception, it is easy to confuse the view that no understanding is foundational with the view that all understanding is interpretive. Yet this confusion of hermeneutic universalism betrays an unseemly residual bond to the foundationalist framework, in the assumption that what is not foundational must be interpretive.” (pp108-109)

Annotation

There are intrinsic prejudices within interpretation as we all perceive within our own reality, collectively mediated within the socio-cultural conditions we share. Hermeneutic interpretation rejects any foundationalist ideas that there is an absolute truth, for a pluralism of perspectival truth that can be corrected, rectified, or reformed with fresh data. But there is a danger in assuming that all understanding that does not have a foundational base has to be interpretive. Prof. Shusterman (1991) cautions that a pragmatic universalist perspective on understanding as nonfoundational should not confuse “the view that no understanding is foundational with the view that all understanding is interpretive” (pp108-109). Equating the interpretative with the nonfoundational has a danger of seeing all understanding as interpretation. Palmer (1969) does have the distance to see understanding as a preliminary act of interpretation, and Bohman (1991) from a holistic perspective acknowledges that a ‘correct’ functionalist or deterministic interpretation cannot explain how humans process and experience the world.

Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory… Understanding Unnderstanding

PALMER, R.E. (1969) Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

“Understanding is not a tool for something else – like consciousness – but rather the medium in which and through which one exists. It can never be objectified, for it is within understanding that all objectification takes place. An existing human being cannot survey understanding from without; understanding is always the position from which all that is seen is seen. No understanding, just because it stands under everything, is not an empty and amorphous mass, a flickering translucence totally filled with the sensations of the present moment. On the contrary, understanding is always necessarily ‘in terms of’ the character of the seeing that is handed down, of our understanding of the present situation, and of a sense what the future can or will hold. Thus this ground upon which we stand in understanding has a fairly definite topography, and every act of interpretation stands within its horizon.” (p228)

Annotation:
All objectification is contained within understanding, so understanding in itself can never be objectified. It is an internal process within the individual. The pre-understanding of the individual and the horizonality of the context in which the individual is experiencing a need for understanding, are important as these dictate the terms in which any understanding arises.

Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory… Visually Revealing the Whole and Parts of an Experience

PALMER, R.E. (1969) Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

“For the theory of interpretation, then, it makes a great difference whether thinking is conceived strictly in ideational terms, for then interpretation itself is dealing not with an unknown matter which has to be brought to light but with the clarification and evaluation of already known data. Then its task is not the primary ‘showing’ of the thing but that of achieving correctness among several possible interpretations. Such presuppositions tend to keep one always in clear light of what is already known instead of bridging the gap between light and darkness.” (p146)

Annotation:
In this context interpretation is framed within a phenomenological inquiry into visually revealing the whole and parts of an experience, bringing to light the meaning of actions within. It is not about interpreting what is already revealed in a new way. As Palmer puts it, “its task is not the primary ‘showing’ of the thing but that of achieving correctness among several possible interpretations” (p146).

Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory… Toward Accepted Knowledge

PALMER, R.E. (1969) Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

“in Being and Time Heidegger finds a kind of access in the fact that one has with his existence, along with it, a certain understanding of what fullness of being is. It is not a fixed understanding but historically formed, accumulated in the very experience of encountering phenomena. (…) Ontology must turn to the processes of understanding and interpretation through which things appear; it must lay open the mood and direction of human existence; it must render visible the invisible structure of being-in-the-world. How does this relate to hermeneutics? It means that ontology must, as phenomenology of being, become a ‘hermeneutic’ of existence. (…) It lays open what was hidden; it constitutes not an interpretation of an interpretation but the primary act of interpretation which brings a thing from concealment.” (p129)

Annotation:

Through hermeneutic interpretation from a Heideggerian phenomenology understanding needs to be seen as more than an interpretation-of-an-interpretation. It is a primary act that brings those internal aspects of being into the external world through discussion toward accepted knowledge. The hermeneutic, intuitive circle of inquiry, counter to being invalid, is a powerful tool to bring those things from concealment that logic alone cannot.

Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory… The Dialectical Nature of the Circle

PALMER, R.E. (1969) Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

“Understanding is a basically referential operation; we understand something by comparing it to something we already know. What we understand forms itself into systematic unities, or circles made up of parts. The circle as a whole defines the individual part, and the parts together form the circle. (…) an individual concept derives its meaning from a context or horizon within which it stands; yet the horizon is made up of the very elements to which it gives meaning. By dialectical interaction between the whole and the part, each gives the other meaning; understanding is circular, then. Because within this ‘circle’ the meaning comes to stand, we call this the ‘hermeneutical circle’. Of course the concept of the hermeneutical circle involves a logical contradiction; for, if we must grasp the whole before we can understand the parts, then we shall never understand anything. Yet we have asserted that the part derives its meaning from the whole. And surely, on the other hand, we cannot start with a whole, undifferentiated into parts. Is the concept of the hermeneutical circle invalid? No; rather, we must say that logic cannot fully account for the workings of understanding. Somehow, a kind of ‘leap’ into the hermeneutical circle occurs and we understand the whole and the parts together. Schleiermacher left room for such a factor when he saw understanding as partly comparative and partly intuitive and divinatory matter. To operate at all, the hermeneutical circle assumes an element of intuition. With its spatial image, the hermeneutical circle suggests an area of shared understanding. Since communication is a dialogical relation, there is assumed at the outset a community of meaning shared by the speaker and the hearer. This seems to involve another contradiction: what is to be understood must already be known. (…) One must already have, in some measure, a knowledge of the matter being discussed. This may be termed the minimal preknowledge necessary for understanding, without which one cannot leap into the hermeneutical circle.” (pp87-88)

Annotation:

Palmer, unlike Hirsch, champions the hermeneutic circle. He argues that the circular, seemingly logical contradiction he summarises as “if we must grasp the whole before we can understand the parts, then we shall never understand anything” (p87) does not make the hermeneutic circle invalid. He sees this interaction between the parts and whole in order to make an interpretation can happen as the dialectical nature of the circle creates a shared area for understanding. He sees not contradiction to logic as, “One must already have, in some measure, a knowledge of the matter being discussed” (p88). To understand this further it is important to see this act of understanding as referential, “we understand something by comparing it to something we already know” (p87). The form understanding takes therefore happens within a horizon of meaning and pre-understanding, and forms itself into a systematic unity of meaning, which contains parts that form the whole meaning. To understand something then both the whole unity and the parts that make up that meaning need to be understood. Understanding is therefore circular as each gives the other meaning, and the meaning arises within the hermeneutic circle. Any misunderstanding of a part of a meaning will skew the understanding of the whole meaning, and lead to interpretations that are not true. Therefore an individual aspect of an experience gains it’s meaning from its context within the experience. It is a part of the experience that if understood in itself and in its context, can lead to a full understanding of the whole experience. Like ways, if the whole experience is considered first then it will be clear that it is made up of different aspects that need to be studied and interpreted to see what is actually happening. The experience gains understanding when seen in its context, yet the context is derived from different parts that allow the experience to be seen as a whole. Palmer argues that ‘logic’ does not solely create understanding; intuition has a part to play (as has been seen). To enter the hermeneutic circle to understand and interpret meaning, it takes an intuitive leap to understand both the parts and the whole together, and not a logical step.

Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory… Hermeneutic Circle

PALMER, R.E. (1969) Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

“For the interpreter to ‘perform’ the text, he must ‘understand’ it: he must preunderstand the subject and the situation before he can enter the horizon of its meaning. Only when he can step into the magic circle of its horizon can the interpreter understand its meaning. This is that mysterious ‘hermeneutical circle’ without which the meaning of the text cannot emerge.” (p25)

Annotation:

Palmer’s defining of the hermeneutic circle comes from building up out of pre-understandings and horizonality. To explain and experience the interpreter needs to understand the experience, which comes from testing and building from pre-understandings of similar experiences. From pre-understandings the interpreter can then focus interpretation from within a horizon of the experience, a context in which the meanings of how it is experienced are focused.

Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory… Horizonal

PALMER, R.E. (1969) Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

“Explanatory interpretation makes us aware that explanation is contextual, is ‘horizonal.’ It must be made within a horizon of already granted meanings and intentions. In hermeneutics, this area of assumed understanding is called preunderstanding.” (p24)

Annotation:

Interpretation for explanatory purposes works in a context of established meanings with granted intentions. In phenomenology this is defined as horizonal. In the Husserlian transcendental school this allows for bracketing of experience to be set, and in Heideggerian phenomenology this horizonality focuses on the pre-understanding that interpreters bring to what they are analysing. “Heidegger’s analysis indicated that ‘understanding’ and ‘interpretation’ are foundational modes of man’s being” (p42).

Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory… Russian Dolls

PALMER, R.E. (1969) Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

“Analysis is interpretation; feeling the need for analysis is also an interpretation. Thus analysis is really not the primary interpretation but a derivative form; it has a preliminarily set the stage with an essential and primarily interpretation before it ever begins to work with the data.” (p23)

Annotation:
Unpacking analysis as an early form of interpretation begins to become problematic as the word ‘interpretation’ keeps being used to describe an earlier stage of itself. Like a Russian doll the deeper we go inside, the smaller the versions of the doll become. If analysis is an interpretive form, then so is the feeling that analysis needs to be made. This takes interpretation internally in on itself and away from the important points as to what it is. 

Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory… Understanding: A Preliminary Act of Interpretation

PALMER, R.E. (1969) Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

“a scientist will call interpretation his analysis of given data; it would be correct also to call his seeing of the data interpretation. Even in the moment that the data becomes statement, interpretation has occurred. Likewise, the literary critic calls his analysis of a work interpretation; it would be correct also to call his way of seeing the work itself interpretation. But the ‘understanding’ that serves as the foundation for interpretation is itself already shaping and conditioning interpretation – it is a preliminary interpretation, but one that can make all the difference because it sets the stage for subsequent interpretation.” (p22)

Annotation:
Understanding is a foundation for interpretation and as Palmer points out, in itself, understanding is a preliminary act of interpretation on which future interpretations are built. If examine this idea understanding emerges from analysis. Analysis of scientific data, or literary work, or studied behaviour, all involve early interpretation from background knowledge to test, understand and interpret.

Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory… Explanatory Form

PALMER, R.E. (1969) Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

“Interpretation as explanation emphasizes the discursive aspect of understanding: it points to the explanatory rather than expressive dimensions of interpretation. Words, after all, do not merely say something (though they also do this, and this is a primary movement of interpretation); they explain something, rationalize it, make it clear. One may express a situation without explaining it; expressing it is an interpretation, but explaining it is also a form of ‘interpretation’.” (p20)

Annotation:
Palmer expresses the difference and interconnectivity between interpretation and understanding. If interpretation is to be used in an explanatory form then it is using the aspect of understanding that needs to be expressed externally to others conversationally or even didactically.