Beneath Interpretation… No Understanding is Foundational

SHUSTERMAN, R. (1991) Beneath Interpretation. In: D.R. HILEY, J.F. BOHMAN, and R. SHUSTERMAN (Eds.) The Interpretive Turn. Cornell University Press. pp102-128

“Since our current hermeneutic turn derives in large part from the rejection of foundationalism, it is not surprising that the central arguments for hermeneutic universalism turn on rejecting foundationalist ideas of transparent fact, absolute and univocal truth, and mind-independent objectivity. For such ideas underwrite the possibility of attaining some perfect God’s-eye grasp of things as they really are, independent of how we differently perceive them, a seeing or understanding that is free from corrigibility and perspectival pluralities and prejudices that we willingly recognize as intrinsic to all interpretation. I think the universalists are right to reject such foundational understanding, but wrong to conclude from this that all understanding is interpretation. Their mistake, a grave but simple one, is to equate the nonfoundational with the interpretive. In other words, what the universalists are successfully arguing is that all understanding is nonfoundational; that is always corrigible, perspectival, and somehow prejudiced or prestructured; that no meaningful experience is passively neutral and disinterestedly nonselective. But since, in the traditional foundationalist framework, interpretation is contrasted and designated as the form of nonfoundational understanding, the inferior foster home of all corrigible, perspectival perception, it is easy to confuse the view that no understanding is foundational with the view that all understanding is interpretive. Yet this confusion of hermeneutic universalism betrays an unseemly residual bond to the foundationalist framework, in the assumption that what is not foundational must be interpretive.” (pp108-109)

Annotation

There are intrinsic prejudices within interpretation as we all perceive within our own reality, collectively mediated within the socio-cultural conditions we share. Hermeneutic interpretation rejects any foundationalist ideas that there is an absolute truth, for a pluralism of perspectival truth that can be corrected, rectified, or reformed with fresh data. But there is a danger in assuming that all understanding that does not have a foundational base has to be interpretive. Prof. Shusterman (1991) cautions that a pragmatic universalist perspective on understanding as nonfoundational should not confuse “the view that no understanding is foundational with the view that all understanding is interpretive” (pp108-109). Equating the interpretative with the nonfoundational has a danger of seeing all understanding as interpretation. Palmer (1969) does have the distance to see understanding as a preliminary act of interpretation, and Bohman (1991) from a holistic perspective acknowledges that a ‘correct’ functionalist or deterministic interpretation cannot explain how humans process and experience the world.

Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory… Toward Accepted Knowledge

PALMER, R.E. (1969) Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

“in Being and Time Heidegger finds a kind of access in the fact that one has with his existence, along with it, a certain understanding of what fullness of being is. It is not a fixed understanding but historically formed, accumulated in the very experience of encountering phenomena. (…) Ontology must turn to the processes of understanding and interpretation through which things appear; it must lay open the mood and direction of human existence; it must render visible the invisible structure of being-in-the-world. How does this relate to hermeneutics? It means that ontology must, as phenomenology of being, become a ‘hermeneutic’ of existence. (…) It lays open what was hidden; it constitutes not an interpretation of an interpretation but the primary act of interpretation which brings a thing from concealment.” (p129)

Annotation:

Through hermeneutic interpretation from a Heideggerian phenomenology understanding needs to be seen as more than an interpretation-of-an-interpretation. It is a primary act that brings those internal aspects of being into the external world through discussion toward accepted knowledge. The hermeneutic, intuitive circle of inquiry, counter to being invalid, is a powerful tool to bring those things from concealment that logic alone cannot.

A Heideggerian Phenomenological Perspective on the Concept of Person… Interpretive Analysis

LEONARD, V.W. (1994) A Heideggerian Phenomenological Perspective on the Concept of Person. In: P. BENNER (Ed.), Interpretive Phenomenology: Embodiment, Caring, and Ethics in Heath and Illness. Sage Publications, Inc. pp43-64

“Interpretive Analysis

Transcribed interviews, observational notes, diaries, and samples of human action are treated as text analogues for interpretive analysis. The data analysis in a hermeneutic study is carried out in three interrelated processes: thematic analysis, analysis of exemplars, and the search for paradigm cases. In the thematic analysis, each case (all interviews, field notes, etc.) is read several times in order to arrive at a global analysis. (…) From this, an interpretive plan emerges. Each interview is then read from the perspective of the interpretive plan. As this microanalysis is carried out, additional lines of inquiry may emerge from the data and are added to the interpretive plan. (…) From this analysis come ‘exemplars:’ stories or vignettes that capture the meaning in a situation in such a way that the meaning can then be recognized in another situation that might have very different objective circumstances. (…) The last aspect of the interpretive analysis involves the identification of paradigm cases: strong instances of particular patterns of meaning. Paradigm cases embody the rich descriptive information necessary for understanding how an individual’s actions and understandings emerge from his or her situational context: their concerns, practices and background meanings. They are not reducible to formal theory – to abstract variables used to predict and control. Rather, what are recognized are ‘family resemblances’ between a paradigm case and a particular clinical situation that one is trying to understand and explain.” (p59)

Annotation:
Through the use of a hermeneutic interpretative analysis of what the observed describe in their experiences as a microanalysis of the themes that are revealed from it. Leonard describes a three-part interrelated process comprising of the thematic analysis [internal], followed by analysis of exemplars [external] and a paradigm case search [imaginative variation]. This interpretative analysis models to Moustakas’ (1994) phenomenological research methodology. The exemplars in this case are external as they are dependent on other studies and are part of the researcher’s analysis rather than what the researcher is revealing in the subject. The looking for exemplars is an act of external validation. The paradigm case search appears to be health practice specific, and therefore not in its entirety useful beyond healthcare. What the paradigm case search does suggest though is a way to examine the interpretations made by the researcher to ensure that there are no additional explanations. This appears to be what the imaginative variation phase of a phenomenological research methodology seeks to do.

Postphenomenology and Technoscience… Hermeneutic Relationship

IHDE, D. (2009) Postphenomenology and Technoscience: The Peking University Lectures. New York: State University of New York Press.

“Hermeneutic relations. I have always held that human technology (experiential) relations form a continuum. As one moves along a continuum, one finds technologies that engage one’s more linguistic, meaning-orientated capacities. Here, while the engagement remains active, the process is more analogous to our reading or interpreting actions than to our bodily action. There are hints of this in Heidegger’s example of the old style turn signal on old European cars, a pointerlike device that pops up and points as a signifying artefact. Writing, of course, is itself a technology, and it is one of the rare examples partially analysed by Husserl as a technology that changes one’s sense of meaning. But my own earlier examples were drawn from instrument readings. Instrument panels remain ‘referential,’ but perceptually they display dials, gauges, or other ‘readable technologies’ into the human-world relationship. And while, referentially, one ‘reads through’ the artefact, bodily-perceptually, it is what is read.” (p43)

Annotation:
Ihde discusses an experiential continuum in human technology, where the process of active engagement in a technology is more meaning-orientated. It is more about interpreting actions than conscious bodily action. Perceptively the information in the visual affordances and calls to action are referentially ‘read through,’ what is read is ‘bodily-perceived’ for the action to be performed. There is a hermeneutic relationship here that pragmatically is practical but can be revealed phenomenologically. 

Running in Hermeneutic Circles: A Visual Phenomenological Methodology

Just been notified that my new paper has been accepted for the Second Interaction Symposium on Culture, Creativity, and Interaction Design at BCS HC I2011 in Newcastle in July. The paper is called Running in Hermeneutic Circles: A Visual Phenomenological Methodology and it is the first stage of developing a Visual Communication methodology synthesising phenomenology.

I'm adding this abstract to the list of papers above.

More info on the symposium as I get it.

Heidegger vs Husserl: Phenomenological choices

In the course of my research towards developing a framework for a Visual Communication Phenomenological Methodology, I have now followed literature back to Nursing sources. Several recommended papers have been useful, and in turn they have also pointed to other possibly useful nursing sources.

Lopez and Willis (2004) help to clarify the different philosophical underpinnings to a Phenomenological study, and the importance of positioning the study clearly within one of the two philosophical schools of Phenomenology.

I'm basing my study on Moustakas' (1994) guidelines, but those are merely generic and non-partisan. As Lopez and Willis state "implementing a method without an examination of its philosophical basis can result in research that is ambiguous in its purpose, structure, and findings" (p726). So I will need to position my research methodology firmly within either the eidetic or hermeneutic schools.

Eidetic Phenomenology is descriptive of the phenomena, and is Husserlian in its philosophical roots. Hermeneutic Phenomenology is interpretive and owes its philosophical roots to Heidegger, a student of Husserl. Where the importance of choosing the philosophical school for a study resides is in how its findings are generated and used. Both schools deal with this differently. Hence the importance of not being generic in the design of the methodology, but philosophically specific.

In Eidetic (Husserlian) research it is important for the researcher to absolutely 'bracket out' prior personal knowledge and biases, to achieve "transcendental subjectivity". This results in the researcher holding in "abeyance ideas, preconceptions, and personal knowledge when listening to and reflecting on the lived experiences of participants" (p728). From these lived experiences features or essences that are common under Phenomenological scrutiny emerge that represent the phenomena's true identity. This is so so that a generalised description can be made, through a foundationalist approach, with a belief (reflecting scientific values) that these essences "can be extracted from lived experiences without a consideration for context" (p728).

In the Hermeneutic philosophical school (or even movement) its application has predominantly been in Theology, and its purpose is to go beyond mere descriptions of core concepts, or essences, "to look for meanings embedded in common life practices" (p728) to bring out what is normally hidden in human experience. Its focus therefore is on what humans experience rather than know within what Heidegger terms being-in-the-world. This situates the experience within a context of a life-world, which all sounds comfortably similar to what Dourish (2004) and Suchman (1987) discuss in part of their respective theses.

As Lopez and Willis discuss "Heidegger asserted that humans are embedded in their world to such an extent that subjective experiences are inextricably linked with social, cultural, and political contexts" (p729). In Hermeneutic Phenomenology its foundational aspect is on the "interpretation of the narratives provided by participants in relation to various contexts" (p729), meaning that unlike Eidetics, the context remains crucial to understanding through interpretation. A fundamental divergence in approaches between the two schools lies in the act of 'bracketing'. In Hermeneutic Phenomenology making any preconceptions on the part of the researcher explicit and explaining their use within the research has a long tradition. Absolute 'bracketing out' that prior knowledge is inconsistent with an interpretive approach. This is a crucial difference I need to build into MY methodology.

Finally Lopez and Willis summarise that an interpretative approach is "useful in examining contextual features of experiences that might have direct relevance to practice. Moreover, a critical hermeneutic framework can enable the researcher to bring to light hidden features of an experience that would be overlooked in a purely descriptive approach" (p734). They urge for careful consideration of which school to choose to inform the analysis. Naturally I feel my framework approach to the methodology is more interpretative, and that will be more useful within design (more on this in a future post).

References used:

DOURISH, P. (2004). Where the Action Is: The Foundations of Embodied Interaction. Cambridge: MIT Press.
LOPEZ, K.A., and WILLIS, D.G. (2004) Descriptive Versus Interpretive Phenomenology: Their Contributions To Nursing Knowledge. Qualitative Health Research, 14(5), pp726-735.
SUCHMAN, L. (1987). Plans and Situated Actions: The Problem of Human-Machine Communication. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.