“The problem of inter-subjectivity is that, while we can each experience the world in an ontological sense, how can we know that each of us is experiencing the same things, given that we do not have direct access to each other’s thoughts and experiences. (…) Dourish posits that intentionality sets up the relationship between embodied action and meaning (Dourish, 2001, p138).” (p38)
Harman (2007) posits that phenomenology can re-establish itself “by expanding the concept of intentionality to the point where it covers the entirety of the things themselves, thereby freeing us from the growing staleness of the philosophy of human access” (p123). Dourish (2001) sees in the Husserlian distinction between act and matter that the manifested intentionality of acting over the matter, of interacting, holds a relationship between the meaning of the interaction and the embodied action of the interaction. O’Neill (2008) concisely reminds that phenomenology offers a philosophy and methodology to reveal what others see as much as possible considering problem of a metaphysical state of being only being existentially experienced.