“The problem of inter-subjectivity
is that, while we can each experience the world in an ontological sense, how
can we know that each of us is experiencing the same things, given that we do
not have direct access to each other’s thoughts and experiences. (…) Dourish
posits that intentionality sets up the relationship between embodied action and
meaning (Dourish, 2001, p138).” (p38)
Annotation:
Harman
(2007) posits that phenomenology
can re-establish itself “by expanding the
concept of intentionality to the point where it covers the entirety of the
things themselves, thereby freeing us from the growing staleness of the
philosophy of human access” (p123). Dourish (2001) sees in the Husserlian
distinction between act and matter that the manifested intentionality of acting
over the matter, of interacting, holds a relationship between the meaning of the interaction
and the embodied action of the interaction. O’Neill (2008) concisely reminds
that phenomenology offers
a philosophy and methodology to reveal what others see as much as possible
considering problem of a metaphysical state of being only being existentially
experienced.
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